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ABSTRACT: Plato's Protagoras casts the leading sophist of the 5th century BCE, Protagoras, against the 
author's paradigmatic philosopher, Socrates. In this paper I focus on what is arguably the guiding 
methodological issue of the dialogue: finding agreement upon impartial, common standards for resolving 
disagreements over abstract questions. In terms of this conference's theme, Protagoras dramatizes a search 
for common ground between figures who fundamentally disagree over how to locate that ground. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent paper, Erik C.W. Krabbe (2002) reconsiders the theoretical relationship 
between rhetoric and dialectic in light of Plato’s Protagoras. Professor Krabbe defines 
“rhetoric” as the theory and practice of speeches, and “dialectic” as the theory and 
practice of conversations; I shall not challenge the distinction, because I find it useful and 
illuminating. Aristotle’s differentiation of rhetoric and dialectic in Topics, Sophistical 
Refutations and Rhetoric is the theoretical and critical focus of Professor Krabbe’s paper 
(actually there are two such papers, but I shall concentrate on the later version, leaving 
aside Krabbe 2000). After reviewing what Aristotle says about the types and goals of 
rhetoric and dialectic in these works (pp. 29-33), Krabbe itemizes four common features 
and four differences (pp. 33-35).1 The conclusion that is drawn at this point is as follows: 
 
for Aristotle rhetoric and dialectic were clearly distinguished, though related arts (or, on the level 
of the individual: faculties). In practice, however, the two were even more entangled than appears 
from th[e] survey [provided elsewhere in the paper]). (Krabbe 2002, p. 35) 
 
1 The common features of rhetoric and dialectic are as follows: neither is confined to any special science; 
both can prove opposite theses to a single question; both can be misused; and both avail themselves of 
inductive means of proof. The differences are as follows: as has been established already, rhetoric has to do 
with speeches, dialectic with conversations; rhetoric addresses a heterogenous crowd, dialectic a smaller 
group; rhetoric aims at persuasion, dialectic at truth; and finally, in practice rhetoric is usually applied to 
practical and specific questions, dialectic to universal and theoretical questions. 
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The entanglement of rhetoric and dialectic in practice is illustrated by the encounter 
between Socrates and Protagoras as it is dramatized in Plato’s Protagoras (Krabbe 2002, 
pp. 35-38). The first lesson drawn from this account is that, in practice, conversations can 
be embedded as functional parts of speeches and that speeches can be embedded as 
functional parts of conversations (Krabbe 2002, pp. 38-39). More programmatically, 
Professor Krabbe (p. 39) encourages argumentation theorists to integrate the theoretical 
treatment of rhetoric and dialectic, rather than treating the two as antagonistic fields (as 
Plato seems to do in Gorgias, for example) or as distinct spheres for theoretical work (as 
Aristotle seems to imply). 
 What I want to do in this paper is return to the text that Professor Krabbe finds so 
instructive and try to extract some more specific hypotheses from the encounter 
dramatized in Plato’s dialogue. Using as my guiding concern “dissensus and the search 
for common ground,” the theme of this conference, I shall concentrate on the dialogue’s 
middle interlude, in which Socrates and Protagoras are joined by several other 
interlocutors as they negotiate the conditions under which the discussion will continue. 
As we shall see, the principal interlocutors in this dialogue come to a procedural and 
ethical impasse that is deeper than that which is strictly meant by “dissenssus” 
(“widespread ... disagreement in opinion; absence of collective unanimous opinion”, 
OED), but its resolution is indeed a search for common ground. 
 Before I begin, one point about the trajectory or telos of the dialogue must be 
stated: Protagoras ends in aporia; in fact, it has one of the most strikingly aporetic 
endings of any Socratic dialogue. Socrates and Protagoras never come to agree on an 
answer to the question they begin with, that is, “is virtue teachable?” More importantly, 
they cannot even agree that this is the primary question to ask. Nor does their discussion 
end with much promise that they might be able to resolve their substantive disagreements 
at a later time. Socrates diagnoses the source of the difficulty as their hastiness in 
pursuing the question about virtue being teachable before they had discovered what virtue 
is, a question Socrates himself had raised numerous times (361c-d).2 In the same passage 
that has Socrates providing this diagnosis, he personifies the argument they have 
followed, and, according to Socrates, “the argument” (tôn logôn) condemns the two of 
them (360e-361c): 
 
Our discussion (tôn logôn), in its present result, seems to me as though it accused and mocked us 
like some human person; if it were given a voice (phônên)3 it would say: “What strange creatures 
you are, Socrates and Protagoras! You on the one hand [Socrates], after having said at first that 
virtue cannot be taught, are now hot in opposition to yourself, endeavouring to prove that all 
things are knowledge–justice, temperance, and courage–which is the best way to make virtue 
appear teachable .... Protagoras, on the other hand, though at first he claimed that it was teachable, 
now seems as eager for the opposite, declaring that it has been found to be almost anything but 
knowledge, which would make it quite unteachable!” 
 
                                                          
2 All references to Plato’s Protagoras (including quotations of Greek and English translations) come from 
Plato 1924. All page references are to the stephanus pages. 
3 Griswold 1999 makes the intriguing suggestion that in this dialogue all discussion of “voice” has 
implications for autonomy. 
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In light of this ending, I am not so confident as Professor Krabbe that this dialogue can be 
used to illustrate anything constructive about the theoretical relationship between rhetoric 
and dialectic (see also Dubose 1973 and Griswold 1999, p. 302). A dialogue that “fails” 
as a probative exercise and arrives at no settled conclusions can hardly exemplify this 
theoretical relationship. So I want to concentrate on where things go wrong and the extent 
to which Plato indicates how they might be set aright during the middle interlude of the 
dialogue (334c-338c). Even after favourable conditions for discussion are established 
during this episode, the dialogue still ends aporetically. But it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to explore what goes wrong between 338d and the end of the dialogue. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF DISSENSUS IN PROTAGORAS (309A-334C) 
 
The main action of Protagoras is a lengthy, lively, wide-ranging and complex discussion 
between Socrates and Protagoras. But before the two central figures come face to face, 
there are two framing episodes. The first, an outer frame for the main action, takes place 
in the street and is a brief exchange of direct dialogue in which Socrates informs an 
unnamed friend that he departed from a meeting with Protagoras only moments before 
(309a-310a). When the friend asks for a report of this meeting, Socrates begins by 
relating an early morning discussion between himself and a young acquaintance, 
Hippocrates. Hippocrates had come to Socrates’ house in the middle of the previous night 
looking for assistance in becoming a student of Protagoras (who has recently arrived in 
town). The discussion that takes place between Socrates and Hippocrates before they 
meet Protagoras constitutes the dialogue’s second, inner frame (310a-316c). Socrates 
remains the narrator until the end of the dialogue.4
 Protagoras is a guest in the house of Callias, a wealthy young Athenian who was 
infamous for both his extravagant lifestyle and his patronage of sophists (see Apology 20a 
for further confirmation). The party of sophists and students at Callias’ is large, and 
Socrates and Hippocrates have trouble getting past the ill-tempered doorkeeper who 
mistakes them for newly arrived sophists (314c-d). After the formalities of introductions 
are completed, Socrates and Protagoras enter into an informal discussion about 
Hippocrates and his prospects as a student of Protagoras (314c-317c). As Socrates tells 
the friend to whom he is narrating these events, Protagoras seems eager to turn the 
interview into a display of his own powers as a public speaker (317c). So Socrates 
suggests that the two of them open up their discussion and invite all those present to 
observe it (317c). The remainder of their meeting therefore has the air of a performance, 
with Socrates representing the interests of Hippocrates (a prospective new protegé for the 
famous sophist) and Protagoras the representative of sophistry (who must convince 
Athenians that his educational program offers real benefits). In setting (Callias’ house), in 
casting (Protagoras, Hippocrates, Socrates, and numerous other historical figures) and in 
                                                          
4 One further point: As the narrator, Socrates reports virtually every word that is said after Hippocrates 
enters his house at 310a. The only exception is a discussion between himself and Hippocrates on the 
doorstep, just before they entered the house of Callias to meet Protagoras. All Socrates says about this 
discussion is that they remained outside so as not to leave it unfinished (atelês). The discussion continued 
“until we had come to an agreement with each other” (heôs sunômologêsamen allêlois, 314c). If Plato had 
wanted to provide a positive model for conducting a fruitful discussion, then this lacuna in Socrates’ 
account is curious. 
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dramatic dating (just as the fifth century Athenian golden age was about to come crashing 
to an end in the Peloponnesian War [431-404 BCE]), Plato has signalled that this 
dialogue dramatizes a momentous occasion. 
 The “performance” commences with Socrates stating some reservations as to the 
very possibility of teaching what Protagoras professes to teach: good judgment 
(euboulia), the political art (tên politikên technên), good citizenship (agathous politas) or 
virtue (aretê) - all of which are used interchangeably to identify the single subject of 
Protagoras’ instruction (317c-320c). Protagoras responds to this challenge with a lengthy 
account of how his instruction will improve a student. This defence is a masterpiece of 
rhetorical oratory which commentators commonly refer to as the Great Speech (320c-
328d). The heart of this speech is Protagoras’ version of the myth of Prometheus and 
Epimetheus and the creation of mortal creatures. Every species is equipped by 
Epimetheus with its own distinctive combination of powers (dunameis) to ensure its 
survival, except human beings who are left defenceless when he fails to set aside any 
powers for them (320d-321c). To save these defenceless creatures, Prometheus steals 
technical knowledge and fire from Athena and Hephaistos, but the separate branches of 
technical knowledge are dispersed to different people and do not promote communal 
living; in this condition, political life was not possible and human beings were vulnerable 
to predation by other species (321c-322c). Zeus then sends Hermes with instructions to 
impose a sense of shame and justice upon all human beings as a way to regulate cities 
(322c-323a). In this way, Protagoras characterizes the subject of his instruction (which 
eventually he settles on calling virtue) as something that does not naturally develop in 
people but is universally acquired by instruction. The myth is supplemented with several 
arguments to corroborate this conclusion and explain why the sons of prominent 
politicians such as Pericles often fail match their fathers in achievement (324d-328d).  
 It is worth noting that Socrates reports that he was left spellbound by this 
oratorical performance, that it took a great effort for him to collect himself afterwards–
i.e., to rouse himself from the role of an eager but passive listener (epithumôn akouein) 
and to resume his role as the active representative of Hippocrates–and to articulate a 
critical response (328d). After Protagoras completes his speech, Socrates reminds 
everyone that Protagoras’s reputation as a superior speech-maker is matched by another 
capacity: “he is able when questioned to reply briefly, and after asking a question to await 
and accept the answer–accomplishments that few can claim” (329b). Here we see 
Socrates establish a distinction that will be crucial to the rest of the dialogue, a distinction 
which Professor Krabbe has identified as that between the standards of rhetoric that apply 
to speeches and the standards of dialectic that apply to conversations. 
 Having established the distinction between these two modes of discussion, 
Socrates then requests a dialectical elaboration on the sophist’s conception of virtue 
(aretê). At times in his speech Protagoras had suggested that virtue is a single quality 
(e.g., 324d-325a), at others a variegated set of qualities (e.g., 322c). Socrates wants 
clarification of this one small detail (328e-329d). Protagoras replies that virtue is a 
complex single quality, and that courage, justice, wisdom, moderation and holiness are its 
composite parts (329d-330b). There follows a series of question and answer exchanges 
about the precise nature of the unity of the special virtues, on which Socrates and 
Protagoras come to no agreement (328d-334c). More precisely, not one of these 
exchanges terminates conclusively, not even with a shared understanding of the precise 
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proposition on which they disagree. The disagreement here is quite sharp and profound. 
As I said earlier, it goes beyond a disagreement of opinion (i.e., dissensus); it is a 
disagreement over the nature, purpose and means of their conference. 
 Dramatically, the discussion has shifted incompletely from being a “rhetorical” 
exercise to a “dialectical” one (or at least, it is on the verge of being a dialectical exercise, 
since Socrates has not been entirely successful in changing the nature of their 
engagement). Not only that, but it is clear that the rhetorical episode was directed by 
Protagoras and the dialectical one primarily by Socrates. Furthermore, since Socrates still 
had “one small difficulty” with Protagoras’s speech and since Socrates’s questions are 
not capable of eliciting satisfactory answers from Protagoras, each of these modes is 
clearly aligned with one and only one of the participants in this discussion. 
Unsurprisingly, the discussion reaches an impasse. Socrates complains that Protagoras’ 
answers have gotten too long (i.e., they are too long for a dialectical “conversation”), 
whereas Protagoras complains that Socrates wants him to make his answers “shorter than 
they should be” (334c-e). The impasse is procedural and ethical rather than substantive. It 
is procedural because Socrates wants a dialectical discussion, Protagoras a rhetorical one. 
And it is ethical because it is fundamentally about the interpersonal conditions of their 
discussion, i.e., it depends on how much each participant is willing to accommodate the 
other. But it is not substantive because Socrates has not been defending his own view on 
the unity of virtue so much as he has been attempting to elicit Protagoras’ views, and 
Protagoras has eluded attempts to have him clear away the “one small difficulty” that 
Socrates had with his speech; in other words, the conditions have not yet been established 
for this discussion to arrive at a substantive disagreement of opinion– i.e., dissensus.  
 It is fair to say that while the nominal meta-level subject of this episode is the 
procedural question (short answers or long ones?), what prevents discussion from 
resuming is the prior ethical disagreement about the nature of the discussion the 
participants are engaged in: Is it a competitive debate or a collaborative conference.5 
When Socrates requests answers that accommodate his own self-described limitations as 
a listener (i.e., brief ones), Protagoras makes the following reply: 
 
Socrates... I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech (agôna logôn), and if I were to 
do what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded, I should not be held 
superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks. (335a) 
 
Whereas Socrates had requested Protagoras’ cooperation (or accommodation), Protagoras 
here openly announces that he understands the discussion in competitive terms. The 
impasse is between a dialectical mode that suits the listener (an audience member during 
Protagoras’ Great Speech and the questioner during the question-and-answerer 
exchanges) and the rhetorical mode that suits the principal speaker (the speech-maker and 
                                                          
5 See Benitez 1992 and Gonzalez 2000, p. 147, n. 25. Benitez (1992, p. 252, n. 96) makes an especially 
good point on the frequency of the term sounousia (association) in this dialogue: “Sounousia appears more 
times in Protagoras (15) than in any dialogue except Laws (18), a dialogue seven times its size.” More than 
in any other dialogue, the characters in Protagoras find themselves needing to reflect on the nature of their 
association with each other. 
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the answerer).6 This is a complex contrast, and at this point it is difficult to know how to 
characterize it precisely. Do we emphasize the contrast of modes (speeches vs. 
conversation), of roles (audience member / questioner vs. speaker / answerer) or of the 
personalities involved (Socrates vs. Protagoras)? Protagoras’ remark at 335a implies that 
he conceives of it in terms of the final contrast, i.e., between rival personalities. Socrates, 
on the other hand, seems to conceive of it in terms of the modes or roles; which one of 
these two contrasts applies to Socrates is not clear at the present moment, but it will 
become clearer by the end of the next episode of the dialogue.  
 When difficulties in discussing the unity of virtue become intolerable for 
Socrates, he prepares to leave (335d). This prompts several members of the audience 
speak up. Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus and Hippias (these last two being the 
other successful sophists who are present) offer their own diagnoses of the problems that 
prevent Socrates and Protagoras from proceeding. Each speaker also proposes 
arrangements for resuming the discussion in a manner that is satisfactory to everyone 
(335d-338e). This three-page episode, which is found in the middle of the dialogue, is 
what I want to focus on.  
 
THE MIDDLE INTERLUDE: EXEGESIS 
 
The interlude is precipitated by a question from Socrates to Protagoras about whether 
“the good” and “the profitable” are identical (333e). To this Protagoras replies with a 
speech of less than one page which culminates with the claim that “the good is such an 
elusive and diverse thing” (333e-334c). It is at this point that Socrates begs Protagoras to 
accommodate his own limitations as a listener: he is forgetful and cannot remember the 
subject of discussion when a speech goes on at length; please answer briefly.7  
 When Protagoras steadfastly refuses to accommodate the request for brevity, 
Socrates prepares to leave. Thereupon Callias, the host, lays hands upon Socrates and 
implores him to remain. He says, 
 
We will not let you go, Socrates; for if you leave us our discussions (hoi dialogoi) will not go so 
well. I beg you therefore to stay with us, for there is nothing I would rather hear (akousaimi) than 
an argument between you and Protagoras. Come, you must oblige us all. (335c-d) 
 
Callis claims to speak for everyone, but his principal concern is with his own pleasure as 
a spectator to the performance by Socrates and Protagoras. He goes on: “Protagoras 
thinks it is only just (dikaia) to claim that he be allowed to discuss in his chosen style, in 
                                                          
6 There is a further difference to be drawn within these categories of speaker and listener. As Socrates’ 
initial response to Protagoras’ speech indicates, the oratorical audience is largely passive, whereas a 
questioner takes a more active role in the question-and-answer exchange. And the orator must make only 
minimal accommodation for the audience of his speech (see 320c, where Protagoras emphasizes his senior 
position and begins the Great Speech with a mythos because he believes his audience will find this “more 
agreeable” than a logos), whereas an answerer must be responsive to the questioner on an ongoing basis. 
7 Since Socrates is narrating all but the first page of this dialogue, there can be no doubt that he’s insincere 
about his memory problem–not only is he capable of remembering it, he does in fact remember it. After all, 
as our narrator he recites it word-for-word. Within the dialogue, Alcibiades expresses his own suspicions 
about Socrates’ professed limitations (336c-d). 
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return for your claim that it should be in yours” (336b).8 Not only does Callias betray a 
partisan preference for Protagoras’ side in this procedural dispute, he takes up Protagoras’ 
interpretation of the fundamental procedural point at issue as being a clash of personal 
preferences. At the ethical level, justice is assumed by Callias to consist of each person 
being able to do as he pleases (see Gonzalez 2000, pp. 123-4). We can characterize 
Callias’ contribution as (a) naive (since he accepts the description of the dispute as being 
exactly how it is described), (b) personal (Socrates versus Protagoras), and (c) 
Protagorean (not simply because he takes Protagoras’ side on the procedural question but 
also because he accepts Protagoras’ interpretation of the dispute as being between 
competing personal preferences). 
 Since Callias has claimed to speak on behalf of the group (even if he acts only for 
his own pleasure), it is entirely appropriate that others join in the procedural discussion. 
Alcibiades then intervenes on Socrates’ behalf, suggesting that Socrates is more capable 
of following long speeches than he admits, but insisting that Protagoras must either speak 
briefly as the conversational mode requires or concede that he is inferior to Socrates in 
this mode (336b-c). Alcibiades adopts a more sophisticated interpretation of the dispute 
than Callias [i.e., as opposed to (a) above], for he recognizes that something is operating 
under the surface of the words. But, like Callias, he sees the dispute as (b) fundamentally 
personal, and he adopts a partisan stance towards it. Essentially, his interpretation, too, is 
(c) Protagorean in the sense that he conceives the dispute as a competition rather than a 
collaboration, even if his partisan allegiance lies with Socrates. Procedurally, Alcibiades’ 
contribution constitutes no advance over Callias’ because it really amounts to little more 
than a counter-proposal to Callias’ original appeal to Socrates. But ethically it constitutes 
a partial advance. Like Callias, Alcibiades conceives of the encounter competitively; at 
the same time, it is an ethical advance in so far as he encourages the interlocutors to 
negotiate concessions and counter-concessions which require some mutual 
accommodation (Socrates acknowledges Protagoras’ superiority at speeches, and 
Protagoras must acknowledges Socrates’ superiority at conversations). Moreover, while 
Alcibiades seems to have the same conception of justice as Callias, his conception of the 
community of discourse is wider and more inclusive than Callias’. He actively invites 
other members of the party to contribute to the discussion (unlike Callias who simply 
claimed to speak on behalf of everyone, 335d).  
 Critias takes up this invitation and points out that Callias and Alcibiades have 
been playing favourites; Alcibiades, in particular, is seized by his characteristic love of 
victory (philonikos, 336d-e). The audience should be non-partisan: “It is not for us to 
contend on either side,” he says (336e). Critias also consciously seeks to elevate the 
discussion by introducing general principles. He does this not by introducing them 
himself, however, but by inviting suggestions from the two other prominent sophists 
present, Prodicus and Hippias. Everyone present has a common (koinê) cause in keeping 
the discussion alive, but Prodicus and Hippias are appealed to directly as sources of 
independent, non-partisan insight (336d). Thus, Critias characterizes the dispute in 
impersonal terms, but without providing (d) the conceptual tools to characterize it 
precisely or (e) any directions for resolving it.  
                                                          
8 I have altered the English text slightly, changing Lamb’s translation of dikaia from “fair” to “just”. 
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 Procedurally, Critias makes no advance over Callias and Alcibiades, but only 
because of his deference to Prodicus and Hippias–not because he agrees with his 
predecessors in the interlude. Ethically, he makes a significant advance over his 
predecessors because he introduces a common standard, one that transcends the partisan 
divisions that are accepted implicitly in the conceptions of justice by Callias and 
Alcibiades. The appeal to Prodicus and Hippias, who as sophists make some implicit 
claims to being knowledgeable, implies further that the common standard he seeks must 
be impartial, abstract and general. If Protagoras is rooted in the empirical community, the 
one in which he has won his fame by proving to be a superior contestant in competitive 
debates, Callias and Alcibiades represent the concerns of those from this community. 
Critias, by contrast, speaks for those who have grown frustrated with this very 
community and are critical of its conventional normative standards. But, not knowing 
where to look for an alternative, Critias turns to the self-described intellectuals in 
attendance, those figures whose novel and sophisticated approaches to argumentation and 
discourse seem to offer hope for overcoming existing problems in public deliberation–
either in conversations or in speeches. 
 Prodicus responds first to this special invitation by providing a series of general 
conceptual distinctions that frame the ethical problem before everyone [(d) above]. The 
audience, he says, should attend jointly to both interlocutors but pay more heed to the 
wiser of them (337a). Socrates and Protagoras should not wrangle in a spirit of enmity, 
but debate as friends in a spirit of fellow-feeling (337a-b). In this way, they will earn the 
sincere good opinion of the audience and not merely signs of praise (337b). And the 
audience will be intellectually satisfied, not merely pleased by the experience (337b-c). 
Thus, Prodicus provides some analytical tools for understanding the discussion and some 
formal, ethical criteria for evaluating any subsequent proposed solutions for its 
continuation. But he provides no direct advice for solving the problem at hand, that is, 
how to overcome the particular impasse before Socrates and Protagoras. So in responding 
to the first part of Critias’ invitation (d), Prodicus addresses problems concerning the 
ethical dimension of their discussion, but in remaining silent about the second part of 
Critias’ invitation (e) he makes no contribution to the procedural dimension.  
 Hippias then offers a practical suggestion for resuming the discussion that 
addresses both the ethical and procedural dimensions of the impasse. He begins with a 
preamble about the natural kinship of the Greeks (as opposed to merely customary and 
enforced association), which would be shameful to betray in churlish quarrelling (337d). 
He proposes a “middle way”: Socrates should not be so fastidious in demanding brevity, 
whereas Protagoras should rein himself in (337e-338a). He encourages the group to 
deputize an umpire, “who will keep watch for you over the due measure of either’s 
speeches” (338a). Having praised everyone present for their natural affinities and wisdom 
in his preamble, Hippias introduces his procedural proposal with the following remark: 
“Now let me beg and advise you ... to come to terms arranged, as it were, under our 
arbitration ...” (italics added, 337d-e). The suggestion amounts to this: since everyone 
present is endowed with natural good sense, any one among them may be selected to 
serve the umpire’s role.9 Any one of the audience members would be as good as any of 
                                                          
9 Several commentators have detected hints in Hippias’ remarks that he himself would be the best umpire, 
but I cannot agree with this interpretation. Nothing he says implies that he has any special qualifications for 
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the others. And, of course, if a single person played this role, any future disagreements on 
procedure would be settled conclusively (albeit somewhat arbitrarily, not on the basis of 
independent criteria). So Hippias has found a way to address the second problem opened 
up by Critias [(e) above] and to frame it with a response to the first problem [(d) above]. 
 Everyone except Socrates approves Hippias’ proposal (338b). Socrates’ own 
proposal for supervising the discussion builds on Hippias’ praise for the natural 
intelligence of all those present: 
 
If Protagoras does not wish to answer, let him ask questions, and I will try to show him how the 
answerer, in my view, ought to answer; and when I have answered all the questions that he wishes 
to ask, in his turn he shall render account in like manner to me. So if he does not seem very ready 
to answer the particular question put to him, you and I will join in beseeching him, as you 
besought me, not to upset our conference. And for this plan there is no need to have one man as 
supervisor; you will all supervise it together. (338d-e) 
 
When everyone accepts this revision of Hippias’ proposal, Socrates has, in one important 
respect, completed a transformation in the group dynamics that is quite significant. As his 
own first-personal account of the effect of Protagoras’ speech implies, Protagoras’ 
oratory (and presumably any effective speech) has the effect of dulling the critical 
judgment of its audience, and it requires a tremendous effort to activate those critical 
faculties afterwards. Socrates managed to rouse himself and generate a critical response 
to Protagoras’ speech at 328d; the current proposal is designed to activate the critical 
judgment of the entire group, that is, to transform them from a passive collection of 
spectators of his discussion with Protagoras into active participants. The supervisory 
responsibilities that Hippias had proposed be invested in the (potentially arbitrary) 
judgment of a single person is now to be shared collectively by everyone in attendance. 
 As with Hippias’ contribution to this interlude, the preamble to Socrates’ 
procedural proposal merits some attention. Whereas Hippias’ proposal had invested the 
final decision on matters of procedure in the person of the umpire (whoever that turned 
out to be), Socrates emphasizes the criteria on which such decisions must be based: 
 
if he who is chosen ... is to be our inferior, it would not be right to have the inferior overseeing the 
superior; while if he is our equal, that will be just as wrong, for our equal will do very much as we 
do, and it will be superfluous to choose him. You may say you will choose one who is our superior 
... [but it is] impossible–to choose one who is wiser than our friend Protagoras .... (338b-c) 
 
Wisdom is the quality necessary for the position of responsibility identified by Hippias, 
and the criterion upon which a judgment is based must be rationally defined (see also 
Garver 2004, p. 366). But, as Socrates’ trilemma demonstrates, there is no sense in 
looking for one person in the group who enjoys some special advantage in this regard. 
His own suggestion escapes between the horns, so to speak: they must all attend critically 
to Protagoras. In this way, Socrates’ proposal is more logically consistent with Hippias’ 
appeal to have Socrates and Protagoras submit to the group’s arbitration. Whereas 
Hippias had the group concentrate its powers into the hands of one member, Socrates 
proposes that they retain collective responsibility. This is not to say that a group is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this job (or that any special qualifications are needed), and everything he does say indicates explicitly that 
everyone present possesses the minimum qualifications for the role he defines. 
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guaranteed to be wise; rather, as we shall see, it is that a properly constituted group (one 
that aspires to find and respect impartial normative standards of discourse) is less 
constrained by its existing epistemic limitations than an individual. 
 But Hippias is not the only one whose contribution during this episode is modified 
by Socrates’ proposal. Let me review the episode in light of Socrates’ final suggestions.  
 Callias was the only one who appealed to Socrates exclusively and directly to 
remain and continue the discussion, but the conception of justice operative in Callias’ 
appeal was unable to mediate the differences between Socrates and Protagoras. Now 
Socrates reminds everyone that he had been appealed to in this way (“as you besought 
me”), but he encourages everyone to evaluate the discussion according to transpersonal 
standards and to demand that Protagoras respect these standards. Alcibiades had 
encouraged Socrates not to concede to Protagoras’ preferred mode of discourse; 
additionally, he introduced the idea that standards of superiority and inferiority applied to 
such situations. Now Socrates proposes a non-partisan, normative standard, and he 
appeals to the entire group to respect it (just as Alcibiades appealed to the entire group to 
speak up). Critias had called on Prodicus and Hippias as intellectuals to provide some 
non-partisan direction for overcoming the impasse. Now Socrates offers a proposal that 
emphasizes the role of knowledge (wisdom) but does not presume the need for 
specialized knowledge. Prodicus had worked out a normative, theoretical framework for 
both the speakers and the audience of a discussion, but he sharply differentiates the 
speakers from the audience and offers no procedural guidance. Now Socrates has altered 
the theoretical framework by virtually dissolving the division between the interlocutors 
and the audience, and he has provided a procedure for resolving the impasse. Finally, 
Hippias had partially dissolved the division between interlocutors and audience by 
recommending that one member of the audience be selected to oversee the discussion–
effectively turning this one spectator into a participant. Now, as we observed, Socrates 
dissolves this division almost entirely by calling on all of the audience to take on this 
responsibility, that is, by turning them all into participants. 
 The part of Socrates’ proposal which is purely procedural is the suggestion that he 
and Protagoras exchange roles. This clears up one lingering uncertainty about how he 
conceives of the impasse between himself and Protagoras. Has he dug in his heels in 
defence of his preferred mode of discussion (conversation over speeches) or over his own 
role in a conversation (as questioner rather than as answerer)? At the beginning of the 
interlude it looked as if Socrates was asserting some right as a questioner to receive short 
rather than long answers. But the proposal to switch roles makes his demands clearer. As 
far as Socrates is concerned, it is the mode of discussion, not the assignment of roles 
(questioner or answerer), that is crucial. 
 
INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERLUDE 
 
One might be tempted to say that, in getting the group to accept his proposal for 
continuing the discussion, Socrates has imposed his own stamp on the proceedings and 
secured a procedural victory; that is, in this “contest of speech” (agôna logôn) Socrates 
has succeeded in forcing Protagoras to “argue in just the way [his] opponent demanded”. 
Interpretations of this dialogue which claim that Socrates is outwitting the sophists in 
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their own game seem to imply this.10 But this description concedes that Protagoras was 
correct in his ethical conception of what is at stake in this impasse: that it is a clash 
between Socrates’ way and Protagoras’ way of proceeding, between contesting for 
superiority on Socrates’ ground or Protagoras’ ground. Socrates’ real “victory”, so to 
speak, in securing this outcome consists in elevating the discussion from that of a contest 
to that of a collaborative venture. Yet it remains a collaboration in which all the 
participants fulfil their function by maintaining a critical posture towards each other. 
Moreover, it is not really “Socrates” victory at all, for this description of the interlude 
fails to acknowledge the crucial instrumental role of the other speakers. It was their 
common concern to maintain the discussion that propelled this elevation, even if their 
individual reasons for desiring its continuation were quite diverse.11 Socrates’ own 
proposal depended on the contributions of all those who preceded him–Callias, 
Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus and Hippias. If nothing else, he has made it difficult for 
Protagoras to retreat behind a false dichotomy between his own way of proceeding and 
Socrates’ way. 
 When this interlude began, Protagoras had suggested one strategy for the two of 
them to find common ground: Socrates could move to the sophist’s territory and compete 
on Protagoras’ own terms. Had Socrates accepted this condition, the only thing 
“common” about this ground would that both Socrates and Protagoras occupied it. 
Protagoras wanted to retain control over the conditions of discussion, especially the 
normative standards of discourse. Now we see the entire group, spurred by Socrates’ 
threat to abandon the discussion, move to new ground. In one sense this is Socrates’ 
ground, but only in the sense that he prefers to operate under conditions arbitrated by the 
group and in accordance with impartial standards rather than those preferred by 
Protagoras. Unlike Protagoras’ common ground, Socrates has no proprietorial claims 
over this new territory. No one controls it. This is, ultimately, the crux of Socrates’ 
criticism of the proposal to name a single umpire: thereafter the discussion would be 
constrained by that person’s individual judgement. Additionally, this kind of domination 
is what differentiates rhetoric (understood as the giving of speeches–in the terminology of 
                                                          
10 I don’t want to single out any of the authors cited in my references, for this strategy is common–not the 
unique contribution of this or that scholar.  
11 I don’t think sufficient attention has been paid to the dramatic byplay in this episode, especially to the 
question as to why this diverse group should be so keen to keep the discussion going. Usually, there’s little 
direct evidence for the “motives” behind the secondary characters in a Platonic dialogue, but in this case we 
are encouraged to speculate a little. The motives of Callias and Alcibiades are fairly clear. Callias comes 
across as a kind of intellectual voyeur who derives personal pleasure from attending debates and speeches 
but does not get involved in the trenches–he only wants to perpetuate the spectacle. Alcibiades has a 
partisan desire to see his friend Socrates triumph over the renowned Protagoras. Both Prodicus and Hippias 
must be imagined to relish the prospect of a leading rival being humiliated by Socrates before a group of 
patrons. (Interestingly, they get too close to the action when they, along with Protagoras, are induced to 
endorse hedonism at 357b-358c; when this thesis proves problematic for Protagoras, it has devastating 
implications for them, too.) Critias is much more difficult to pin down this way, but we might imagine him 
speaking sincerely as someone who has grown frustrated with interminable partisan wrangling, and who 
mistakenly believes the problems can be solved procedurally and technically. I must admit that I’m not 
very confident about these speculations, which is why I have not made my interpretation depend upon 
them.  
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this episode, long answers) from dialectic (understood as the practice of giving short 
answers). 
 Commentators have long suspected that Socrates’ complaint in response to 
Protagoras’ brief speech about the good (333e-334c) is not really about the length of the 
answers themselves. Alcibiades is entirely correct to point out that Socrates is not as 
forgetful as he says he is. In any case, Protagoras’ Great Speech was much longer, and in 
a few pages Socrates will give the second-longest speech of the dialogue (341d-347a). 
We are given some indication by Plato not to take this demand literally; all the same, we 
need to take it seriously and consider what it ultimately amounts to. It is usually taken to 
be an indirect demand that the answer be relevant to the question (Krabbe 2002, p. 37; 
see also Miller 1978 and Cohen 2002). However, in Protagoras no special emphasis is 
placed on the criterion of relevance, a material condition concerning the subject of 
discourse. Certainly, long speeches are not intrinsically susceptible to irrelevance; 
Protagoras’ Great Speech, for example, seems to reply to the questions which prompted 
it. However, speeches are subject to the control of the speech-maker, and Socrates’ 
“forgetfulness” is invoked as part of a request that Protagoras relinquish some control 
over the discussion and accommodate his questioner and his audience. It is significant 
that Socrates prepares to leave when Protagoras denies having any obligation to make 
such an accommodation. And it is only when the audience members–in a collective effort 
to save the discussion–transform the ethical conditions of the conference that Socrates 
agrees to stay. 
 In a collectively regulated exchange of questions and answers, no single person 
controls the discussion. Both questioner and answerer must submit to standards of length, 
relevance, truth, inference, etc. that must be defined independently of their own 
individual preferences or interests. Such standards are, so to speak, outside their exclusive 
domain of control. And when Socrates proposes that the audience become active 
participants, as the collective umpires of the subsequent dialectical exchange, then there 
is a sense in which everyone must take ownership of the discussion and accept 
responsibility for its success or failure. But Protagoras must be cajoled into releasing 
normative control of the discussion and submitting to the collective regulation of the 
audience. It is no wonder, then, that he takes up his new role of questioner “very 
unwillingly” (panu ouk êthelen, 338e). The resolution has obliged him to make a choice: 
either move from his own ground and accept terms for discussion other than his own or 
withdraw from the discussion entirely. But his audience has moved, and he must either 
move with them or let them move on without him. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine one episode in Plato’s Protagoras closely. 
In this task, I have been trying to extend Professor Krabbe’s work and examine the 
dialogue for some specific hypotheses about the relationship between rhetoric and 
dialectic, not to reconsider how the dialogue is used in Professor Krabbe’s own argument. 
Nevertheless, I think it is worth noting in closing that Plato endorses a sharper distinction 
between these two modes of discussion than that which is endorsed in Krabbe 2002, and 
that he expresses a clear preference for dialectic over and against rhetoric. We see not 
only Socrates but the entire group (except Protagoras) slowly disentangling rhetoric 
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(speech-giving) from dialectic (conversation) in a multi-party exchange that itself 
exemplifies dialectic. Indeed, judging from this episode of Protagoras, Plato seems to 
prefer public discourse that is purged of rhetoric and consists entirely of conversations, 
but not because there is something intrinsically wrong with long speeches or because 
there is something procedurally superior about brevity. Rather, it is because control 
cannot be monopolized in a conversation in the way it can be in oratory, and the 
community of discourse can be wider and more critically engaged in a conversational 
forum than in an oratorical forum. As I read this episode, the message underlying 
Protagoras is not that speeches and conversations can be functionally parts of each other, 
but that in a properly constituted conference discussion will proceed as a conversation in 
which all the participants respect impartial standards of discourse. This point is, of 
course, ethical, not procedural, and it envisions an ideal community, not the empirical 
community in which Socrates found when he first entered the house of Callias. But the 
ideal is not merely some theoretical abstraction or utopian conception. It is something 
that can be realized, however imperfectly and incompletely, through negotiations that aim 
to preserve the conversation as a critical forum for intellectual engagement, the kind of 
negotiation dramatized in this wonderful episode of Protagoras. 
 
link to commentary
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